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Summary 
Nowadays, as stressed by important strategic documents like for instance the 2009 EU 
White Paper on Adaptation or the recent 2009 “Copenhagen Accord”, it is amply 
recognized that both mitigation and adaptation strategies are necessary to combat climate 
change. This paper enriches the rapidly expanding literature trying to devise normative 
indications on the optimal combination of the two introducing the role of catastrophic and 
spatial uncertainty related to climate change damages. Applying a modified version of the 
Nordhaus’ Regional Dynamic Integrated Model of Climate and the Economy it is shown that 
in both cases uncertainty works in the direction to make mitigation a more attractive 
strategy than adaptation. When catastrophic uncertainty is concerned mitigation becomes 
relatively more important as, by curbing emissions, it helps to reduce temperature increase 
and hence the probability of the occurrence of the event. Adaptation on the contrary has no 
impact on this. It is also shown that optimal mitigation responses are much less sensitive 
than adaptation responses to spatial uncertainty. Mitigation responds to global damages, 
while adaptation to local damages. The first, being aggregated, change less than the second 
in the presence of spatial uncertainty as higher expected losses in some regions are 
compensated by lower expected losses in other. Accordingly, mitigation changes less than 
adaptation. Thus if it cannot be really claimed that spatial uncertainty increases the weight 
of mitigation respect to that of adaptation, however its presence makes mitigation a “safer” 
or more robust strategy to a policy decision maker than adaptation. 
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Abstract       
Nowadays, as stressed by important strategic documents like for instance the 2009 EU White 
Paper on Adaptation or the recent 2009 ―Copenhagen Accord‖, it is amply recognized that 
both mitigation and adaptation strategies are necessary to combat climate change. This paper 
enriches the rapidly expanding literature trying to devise normative indications on the optimal 
combination of the two introducing the role of catastrophic and spatial uncertainty related to 
climate change damages. Applying a modified version of the Nordhaus’ Regional Dynamic 
Integrated Model of Climate and the Economy it is shown that in both cases uncertainty 
works in the direction to make mitigation a more attractive strategy than adaptation. When 
catastrophic uncertainty is concerned mitigation becomes relatively more important as, by 
curbing emissions, it helps to reduce temperature increase and hence the probability of the 
occurrence of the event. Adaptation on the contrary has no impact on this. It is also shown 
that optimal mitigation responses are much less sensitive than adaptation responses to spatial 
uncertainty. Mitigation responds to global damages, while adaptation to local damages. The 
first, being aggregated, change less than the second in the presence of spatial uncertainty as 
higher expected losses in some regions are compensated by lower expected losses in other. 
Accordingly, mitigation changes less than adaptation. Thus if it cannot be really claimed that 
spatial uncertainty increases the weight of mitigation respect to that of adaptation, however its 
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In 1992, 154 nations signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change at 
Rio de Janeiro. Its aim was to stabilize GHG concentrations at a level "that would prevent 
dangerous  anthropogenic  interference  with  the  climate  system".  When  the  battle  against 
climate  change  started  it  was  thus  focused  on  mitigation  measures.  Ten  years  later,  the 
Working  Group  II  contribution  to  the  IPCC  TAR  "Impact,  Adaptation  and  Vulnerability" 
(IPCC  2001)  emphasized  as  fundamental  the  role  of  adaptation  to  "reduce  many  of  the 
adverse impacts of climate change and enhance beneficial impacts". This was a neat shift in 
emphasis  driven  by  the  increasing  awareness  that  climate  change  could  not  be  halted 
irrespectively  of  the  implementation  of  aggressive  mitigation  efforts.  Indeed,  the  strong 
inertias in the climate system will expose modern societies to some degree of warming no 
matter what they do to curb emissions. Needless to say, the constant difficulties encountered 
by international climate negotiations, hardly justify optimisms in the effective likelihood to 
observe the implementation of aggressive mitigation in the short term.   
Therefore nowadays, as stressed by important strategic documents like for instance the 
2009 EU White Paper on Adaptation or the recent 2009 ―Copenhagen Accord‖, it is amply 
recognized that both mitigation and adaptation strategies are necessary to combat climate 
change. Against this background, a rapidly expanding literature is trying to devise normative 
indication on the optimal combination of the two in a cost efficient policy. This investigation 
is extremely complex due to the many uncertainties that still surround the climate change 
issue. Indeed the knowledge of climate dynamics, of the related environmental damages, on 
their  economic  relevance  and  of  the  costs  of  climate  change  policies,  especially  when 
adaptation is involved, is still far from conclusive. Decisions however have to be made and, 
given the abovementioned climatic inertias, they cannot be postponed for too long were they 
expected to produce some results within the century. 
    This paper investigates how the presence of uncertainty about climate change damages 
can shape decision making and, more specifically, the optimal mix between mitigation and 
adaptation.  Two  sources  of  uncertainty  are  considered:  the  uncertain  occurrence  of  a 
catastrophic event - what we define ―event uncertainty‖ - and the uncertainty related to the 
geographic  distribution  of  climatic  damages,  what  we  call  ―spatial  uncertainty‖.  These 
different  uncertainty  sources are  implemented  into  an  integrated  assessment  model  where 
mitigation and adaptation are available policy choices for the decision maker.   
    Section 2 proposes a brief literature review. Section 3 introduces the integrated model, 
the inclusion of adaptation and uncertainty and describes the calibration process. Section 4 
elaborates the results derived from the modeling exercise. Section 5 draws major conclusion. 
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2. Literature Review 
The consequence of climate change can be grouped into two categories: changes in average 
conditions and changes in extreme conditions (IPCC TAR 2001). The former induce impacts 
which are gradual and continuous, often within the coping range of systems; the latter are 
discontinuous events bringing about, potentially, a sharp decline of social welfare outside the 
coping range. The collapse of North Atlantic Thermohaline Circulation (THC), a "runaway" 
greenhouse effect (climate change could be much greater and occur much faster than the 
common consensus indicated), the disintegration of West Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS), are all 
examples of such discontinuity (Pearce et al. 1996; Guillerminet and Tol 2008). Catastrophic 
events are usually associated with very low probability, but, once materialized, with great and 
sudden harm (Posner 2004). This ―event uncertainty‖ is obviously expected to influence the 
decision  making  process.  In  the  climate  change  impact  literature  there  is  indeed  a 
consolidated research showing that it induces higher mitigation rates (Clark and Reed 1994; 
Yohe, 1996; Gjerde et al. 1998; Bosello and Moretto 1999; Ingham et al. 2005b) and earlier 
action of emission control (Baranzini et al. 2003; Guillerminet and Tol 2008). These studies 
however do not push the investigation to analyze the consequences of these uncertainties on 
the optimal mix between mitigation and adaptation strategies.   
Conversely, a  very  recent  stream  of  research  does analyze the  optimal  mix  between 
adaptation and mitigation using applied Integrated Assessment Model (IAM) (De Bruin, et al. 
2007, 2009; Bosello 2010; Bosello et al. 2010). The robust outcome of these studies is that 
adaptation and mitigation are strategic complements: the optimal policy consists of a mixture 
of adaptation measures and investments in mitigation, this is also true in the short term even 
though mitigation will only decrease damages in later periods as emission cuts can slow down 
temperature increase and the related damages with a delay of 50-80 years.   
All  the  authors  also  highlight  the  existence  of  a  trade  off  between  strategies:  being 
resources  scarce,  more  on  one  means  less  on  the  other.  Moreover,  successful  adaptation 
reduces  the  marginal  benefit  of  mitigation  and  a  successful  mitigation  effort  reduces  the 
damage to which it is necessary to adapt. However this second effect is notably weaker than 
the  first.  Indeed  mitigation  especially  in  the  short-medium  term  lowers  only  slightly 
environmental damage stock and therefore does little to decrease the need to adapt.   
In addition, in all these studies the bulk of resources are devoted to adaptation especially 
when discount rates are high and when investment in adaptation can build a cumulating stock 
of  ―defensive‖  infrastructures.  In  these  cases  adaptation  appears  far  more  effective  than 
mitigation, especially in the short term, to contrast climate change damages.   
These  researches  however  are  based  on  integrated  assessment  models  which  exclude 
irreversible,  low-probability  extremely  damaging  climatic  events.  They  perform  what 
Weitzman  (2009)  defines  in  a  debated  paper  (see  also  Nordhaus  2009)  a  ―standard‖  cost 
benefit analysis. As shown by Weitzman (2009) the cost of a future irreversible event in the 
presence of uncertainty might be infinite. Accordingly, also the willingness to pay to avoid the 
risk of it can become infinite. This, translated into the context of deciding how much it is 
worth  to  mitigate  or  adapt,  (and  assuming  that  adapting  to  a  catastrophe  even  though 
physically  possible  can  be  extremely  costly),  would  implicitly  support  the  idea  that 4 
 
uncertainty  can  shift  the  burden  of  climate  change  damage  reduction  from  adaptation  to 
mitigation. This analysis is not performed by Weitzman though.   
A notable exception in this debate is Ingham et al. (2005). They compound in a theoretical 
model mitigation adaptation and catastrophic outcomes. However they assume that adaptation 
can reduce the damage induced by catastrophic events and show that ―event uncertainty‖ pulls 
up both the mitigation and adaptation investment. Thus mitigation and adaptation remain 
economic substitutes and the optimal mix between the two depends on their relative cost. 
    Another form of uncertainty can influence the mix between adaptation and mitigation: 
that of the geographical distribution of climatic damages. Damages are obviously region and 
site specific. However, even though some general regional patterns and dynamics are well 
understood (for instance higher vulnerability of low than mid, high latitudes, identified hot 
spots for sea-level rise or droughts and floods risk etc.) an exact prediction of where and with 
which intensity a given impact is going to hit is not possible. This is particularly concerning 
for  some  anticipatory  adaptation  practices  entailing  huge  and  almost  irreversible  upfront 
investments. Typical examples are coastal or river hard defenses. In these circumstances the 
private good nature of adaptation comes into play. Its benefits are fully appropriable by the 
community that implements adaptation, but the whole burden of a planning mistake also falls 
on the adapting community. Thus, in the presence of huge spatial uncertainty, anticipatory 
adaptation could be an unattractive option. 
Mitigation on the contrary is a global public good: in principle one ton of CO2 abated 
benefits the world as a whole irrespectively of where it is abated. When a planner decides to 
mitigate she knows that the damage will be reduced independently upon the location where it 
is going to manifest. In this sense mitigation is more mistake-free than adaptation.   
This issue has not received great attention. In our knowledge it has been tackled just by 
Lecocq and Shalizi (2007). Developing a simple theoretical model they conclude that spatial 
uncertainty enhances the importance of mitigation with regards to adaptation, as the first is 
global and accordingly only marginally determined by the local dimension of climate change 
damages, while, the second is more sector- and site- specific and thus extremely influenced by 
damage  local  specificities.  This  is  the  other  topic  we  would  like  to  investigate  with  our 
applied model.         
3. Adaptation and Uncertainty Modeling 
The modeling tool used to analyze mitigation, adaptation and uncertainty is an improved 
version of the basic Nordhaus and Yang (1996) RICE model. RICE-96 is a climate-economic 
hard-linked  integrated  assessment  tool  originally  designed  to  find  the  optimal  abatement 
effort under different cooperative or non-cooperative setting, in six major geo-political blocks: 
the United States (USA), Japan (JPN), the European Union (EEC), China (CHN), the Eastern 
Europe and Russia (FSU), and the rest of the world (ROW). The economic component is a 
standard Ramsey-Keynes growth model. It is linked to climate dynamics through the emission 
flow, by product of economic activity, which induces temperature increase. This on its turn 
impacts the economic system through a damage function translating warming into GDP losses. 
The  model  is  fully  dynamic:  regional  (or  global)  decision  makers  maximize  aggregated 5 
 
inter-temporal  utility  from  consumption  deciding  investment  and  abatement  rates.  This 
structure  has  been  enriched  including  the  adaptation  policy  option  building  upon  Bosello 
(2010), then coupled in two different experiments with the risk of a catastrophic event, whose 
occurrence is uncertain to the policy makers, and with spatial uncertainty.   
    The complete structure of the model is reported in the Appendix. Below the description 
of the implementation of adaptation and of the two forms of uncertainty follows. 
 
3.1 Adaptation Modeling and Calibration 
Adaptation is modeled as a dedicated investment (IA), which cumulates over time subjected 
to a depreciation rate (the same of physical capital).   
 
                                                                                                 (1) 
 
The resulting stock of adaptation capital (SAD) reduces climate damages decreasing the 
multiplicative coefficient (1-Ω) in the model climate change damage function.   
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According  to  (2)  adaptation  shows  decreasing  marginal  returns  to  scale  by  construction. 
Adaptation  investment  competes  with  investment  in  physical  capital,  consumption  and 
mitigation expenditure in the income budget constraint (3). 
 
                                                                                                           (3) 
 
Mitigation costs, adaptation investments and the residual damage form the climate bill, which 
is the total cost of climate change. 
 
Calibrating adaptation costs and benefits is problematic. Firstly it is not clear if the original 
RICE  damage  function  includes  optimal  adaptation  costs.  If  so,  this  would  require  to 
disentangle adaptation costs from that damage function as done for instance by De Bruin et al. 
(2007,  2009);  Bosello  et  al.  (2009).  Even  if  it  were  so  however,  and  this  is  the  second 
problem, estimates of climate change damages and of adaptation costs are so uncertain that, 
given the present knowledge, it is very hard to justify any assumptions on the size of this 
optimal  adaptation.  What  could  be  done  is  at  best  indicate  some  order  of  magnitude 
(Agrawala and Fankhauser 2008; Nordhaus 2009; Parry 2009). Thus in the present work 
rather  than  engaging  into  complex  calculations  to  extrapolate  from  a  basically  unknown 
damage another unknown optimal adaptation expenditure, it is assumed that adaptation costs 
are not included in the original damage specification of the RICE-96 model. Then the model 
is allowed to define its optimal adaptation level responding to local damages, but within some 
imposed reasonable ―boundaries‖. The reference point for the definition of these boundaries is 
a doubling of CO2 concentration. When this happens, following Tol et al. (1998) and De 
Bruin et al. (2007) it is imposed that global adaptation expenditure ranges between 0.1 and 6 
 
0.5% of GDP, and that the effectiveness of adaptation ranges between 30% - 80% of total 
damage.   
Figure 1 displays the calibrated adaptation expenditure and effectiveness.   
 
 
Figure 1 Effectiveness of Adaptation Investment 
 
3.2 Event Uncertainty Modeling and Calibration 
―Event uncertainty‖ is implemented through a failure distribution function of the duration of 
the  climatic  system  i.e.  the  probability  of  the  occurrence  of  the  catastrophic  event.  It  is 
denoted by a hazard rate which assumes a Weibull form (Kiefer 1988), a simple generalization 
of the exponential distribution. 
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(4) shows that the  maintenance of the atmospheric temperature at the original level T(0) 
eliminates  the  possibility  of  the  occurrence  of  catastrophic  events.  Then,  the  higher  the 
temperature increase, the higher the probability. This depends upon the two parameters   
and η.   
To keep the convexity of the hazard rate function, we assign η the value of 2.5 (Gjerd et 
al. 1998).  is calibrated in order to have a 7% probability to experience a catastrophe, i.e. 
a GDP loss equaling the 25% for a temperature increase of 3° C above pre-industrial period. In 
our model this happens in 2100. The 7% probability is an upward revision of the 4.8% value 
proposed by Nordhaus (1994), in view of more recent studies on the likelihood of catastrophic 
outcomes proposed by Hadely Center (2005) and Tyndall Center (2005). According to both 
the probability of climate-induced catastrophes within this century are much higher: 30% for 
the shutdown of THC according to the first and 4% to 75% for a collapse of the Greenland ice 
sheet  according  to  the  second.  This  suggested  us  to  increase  by  roughly  50%  the  initial 
Nordhaus’ estimate, leading us to a still ―optimistic‖ catastrophic probability estimate of the 









































Reduction of Resicual Damage (%) 7 
 
Catastrophic  uncertainty  affects  decision  making  as  the  planner  now  maximizes  an 
(intertemporal) expected utility function (5) 
 
                                                            
      
                
                                                               
      
                          (5) 
 
In (5) utility is a weighted sum of its catastrophic and non catastrophic realizations, with 
weights given by the probability of the event occurrence. By mitigating the planner can lower 
the temperature increase and thus the probability of the catastrophic event, but of course it 
costs.  In  this  formulation  adaptation  does  not  play  any  direct  role  in  decreasing  the 
catastrophic probability. It neither plays a role in decreasing the post catastrophic penalty on 
utility. The explicit assumption here is that a catastrophe is by definition beyond the adaptive 
capacity of the social economic system.   
 
3.3 Spatial Uncertainty Modeling and Calibration 
The second source of uncertainty considered is spatial uncertainty. It is modeled assigning to 
each of the model’s region a vector of different possible damage parameters. For simplicity 
these  are  the  six  region  specific  damage  parameters  of  the  model.  Thus  each  region  is 
assigned a given probability to experience its own damage or that of each of the other five 
regions for a total of six possible states of the world. For simplicity it is also assumed that all 
the damage parameters are equally probable. 
This replicates a situation in which the world planner (or the group of fully cooperating 
regional planners) does not know exactly with which intensity climate change damages are 
going to hit in the different regions. Accordingly she has to maximize an expected utility 
which averages across the six possible outcomes choosing one investment in physical capital, 
one investment in adaptation and one abatement level. 
The utility function thus becomes: 
     
 
                                                  
       
                                         (6) 
 
4. Results 
Even though RICE is a regional model, results for the ―event uncertainty‖ are displayed and 
analyzed for the world as a whole. The choice to focus on world results is motivated by their 
ability to convey the main messages coupled with the simplicity of exposition. Results for the 
―spatial  uncertainty‖  are  shown  by  region,  but  still  assuming  full  world  cooperation  on 
climate policy. The choice of the cooperative setting is necessary to observe some mitigation 
effort (and thus to have the possibility to compare mitigation and adaptation with and without 
uncertainty). In a non-cooperative environment the public good nature of emission reduction 
and the associated free riding incentive imply an almost null abatement, unless a possible 8 
 
catastrophe is imposed. 
The BAU chosen for the simulation is that of the no policy A2 IPCC SRES scenario. On 
the one hand its storyline seems more plausible, even though rather pessimistic: it assumes the 
persistence  of  regional differences  and  an  almost  neutral  technical  change  not  too biased 
toward decarbonization of the economic systems. On the other hand current GHG emission 
trends are closer to that of the A2 IPCC SRES scenario than to other IPCC scenario family. 
Data for the benchmarking have been extracted form CIESIN (2002), its GDP growths are 
reported in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2 Regional GDP Projections 
 
    In addition to the BAU (denoted by (i) in figures) three other scenarios are proposed: 
mitigation adopted alone (denoted by (ii) in figures); adaptation adopted alone (denoted by (iii) 
in figures); joint implementation of mitigation and adaptation (denoted by (iv) in figures). 
Each of them is discussed first in a context of catastrophic and then of spatial uncertainty 
compared with the certainty case. 
 
4.1 Mitigation and Adaptation under Event Uncertainty 
Figures 3 and 4 show the effect of catastrophic uncertainty on mitigation and adaptation effort 
respectively.   
    In a certain world mitigation and adaptation confirm their strategic complementarity: 
both are used in an optimal climate change strategy as the possibility to introduce mitigation 
(adaptation) does not eliminate the need to adapt (mitigate). They also confirm, in line with 
the theoretical and empirical literature in the field (Tol 2005; De Bruin et al. 2007, 2009; 
Bosello 2010) the existence of a trade-off. The presence of adaptation reduces the need to 
mitigate whereas a successful mitigation reduces the amount of damage one needs to adapt to. 
Moreover mitigation and adaptation compete for scarce funding, thus more placed on one 
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Figure 3 Optimal Mitigation Rate 
 
 
Figure 4 Optimal Adaptation Investment 
 
When event uncertainty is introduced it pulls up, as expected, the optimal mitigation rate 
(by 51%, Fig. 3). On the contrary adaptation investment remains almost unchanged (Fig. 4). 
Since mitigation helps to reduce the probability of catastrophic events and adaptation can only 
control the non-catastrophic damage, a ―catastrophic world‖ would require more mitigation, 
but not more adaptation. More mitigation reduces the probability of the catastrophic outcomes 
(Fig. 5) from the 7.2% to the 5.4%, which means that the temperature increase will be curbed 
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Figure 5a Temperature Increase   
 
 
Figure 5b Probability of the Occurrence of Catastrophic Event 
 
Even in the presence of an uncertain catastrophic event a certain degree of crowding out 
of adaptation on mitigation (and vice versa) still remains. Indeed part of mitigation effort still 
works  to  reducing  the  ―smooth‖  damage  component,  and  this  action  keeps  on  being 
influenced by adaptation activity. However, compared to the certainty case, the crowding out 
of adaptation on mitigation is greatly reduced (it is the 68% smaller in 2100), while that of 
mitigation on adaptation is amplified. This result is quantified also in Table 1 which computes 
the elasticity of mitigation with respect to adaptation and vice versa. Table 1 shows that the 
elasticity of mitigation to adaptation is smaller in the uncertainty than in the certainty case 





























































































































































This outcome highlights that in the presence of an uncertain catastrophic event, more 
adaptation offers a  weaker incentive to reduce mitigation. Indeed even though adaptation 
decreases  the  ―smooth‖  part  of  climate  damage  it  cannot  decrease  the  probability  of  the 
catastrophic occurrence. This is governed by temperature increase and thus by emissions that 
can be controlled only by mitigation.   
 
 
Figure 6 Optimal Expenditure Allocation across Mitigation and Adaptation: Certainty Case 
 
 






























































Figure 8 Proportion of Damage Reduction: Certainty Case 
 
 
Figure 9 Proportion of Damage Reduction: Uncertainty Case 
 
This translates into a drastically increased amount of resources devoted to mitigation 
than to adaptation (comparison of Fig. 6 and Fig.7) and to an evident, but more moderate 
increase of  the  percent  of  damage  reduction due to  mitigation  with  respect  to  adaptation 
(comparison of Fig. 8 and Fig. 9).   
All these said it could be noted that adaptation remains the strategy relatively more 
effective in damage reduction. This however refers to the non catastrophic damage component. 
Indeed  even  though  uncertainty  roughly  increases  mitigation  by  50%  this  then  typically 
deploys its stronger effects with a delay, especially after the end of the century. Along the 
century adaptation still is the main damage reducer.   
As an exercise it can be interesting to compare these results with the mitigation targets 
currently debated in the international context. In the framework of its climate change strategy 
the  EU  proposed  a  safety  threshold  for  temperature  increase  of  2° C  with  respect  to 
pre-industrial levels within the century (CEC 2007). This target has been recently iterated in 
the 2009 Copenhagen Accord. Copenhagen, also proposed a set of non binding commitments 
by  many  countries  ranging  from  explicit  carbon  reduction  policies  to  carbon  and  energy 
efficiency  targets.  It  has  been  estimated  (Carraro  and  Massetti  2010)  that  if  all  these 

















































































mitigation the temperature increase could be kept below 2.5° C (reasonably close to the goal 
of 2° C). Our model would replicate such an outcome if, keeping the catastrophic probability 
at its calibrated level (7%) the related damage would be increased to roughly the 75% of 
world GDP, or conversely if, with a damage kept at its calibrated level (25%), the catastrophic 
probability would be increased to 30%, for a doubling of CO2 concentration. These simple 
estimates  constitute  some  ―back  of  the  envelope‖  calculations  revealing  the  implicit  risk 
perception of the policy decision maker that interestingly enough are close to the scientific 
perception.   
To sum up, we find that compared with the certainty case, the event uncertainty pulls up 
the  optimal  level  of  mitigation;  whereas  the  level  of  adaptation  investment  remains 
unchanged or even decreases. Accordingly, as far as the relationship of the two policies is 
concerned, the event uncertainty decreases the substitutability of adaptation with mitigation 
and increases the appeal of mitigation. This suggests an important policy implication. In a 
world characterized by smooth climatic damages mitigation is a marginal option, viable and 
welfare improving if coupled with adaptation, but anyway secondary if compared with what 
adaptation  can  cost  efficiently  achieve.  In  a  world  with  catastrophic  event  uncertainty 
mitigation  becomes  the  only  strategy  able  to  reduce  the  probability  of  the  catastrophic 
outcomes  and  becomes  the  key  policy  variable.  As  a  consequence  mitigation  should  be 
decided at the outset on the basis of precautionary considerations (and not on ―standard‖ 
cost-benefit approach based on perfect information) and adaptation has to be deployed to 
tackle the residual damage not accommodated by mitigation.     
 
4.2 Mitigation and Adaptation under Spatial Uncertainty 
In the presence of spatial uncertainty, the policy decision maker does not know exactly with 
which intensity climate change damage can hit a given region. The implication is an expected 
damage at the regional and at the world level which differ from those under certainty (Fig. 9 
and Fig. 10). Differences however are more pronounced in the first than in the second case. 
Indeed, when the world is considered, higher expected damages in one region tend to be 
partially compensated by lower expected damages in another. Accordingly, expected damage 
at the world level differs from that under certainty by the 18% at maximum in 2100, while 
regional damages differ from the certainty case in a range between the -36% and 52% in 
2100.   
 























































Figure 11 Percentage change of the expected regional climatic damage w.r.t. certainty case 
 
Spatial uncertainty influences both mitigation and adaptation decisions, but the impact on 
mitigation differs from that on adaptation. 
Mitigation is a global public good accordingly total abatement effort is driven by total 
climate change damage. This effort is then distributed across regions in order to equalize 
marginal abatement costs, but these are not affected by spatial uncertainty. The consequence 
is that the (moderately) reduced total damage at the world level induces a roughly uniform 
moderate reduction of abatement effort in each region of the model (roughly -2% see Fig. 12). 
Interestingly all regions reduce their abatement effort irrespectively of the fact that expected 
damages in some of these regions can increase. 
Adaptation, on the contrary, is a private good. It tackles local damages and benefits the 
region that is adapting. Thus adaptation responds much more than mitigation to changes in 
regional damages. It increases when the expected damage increases and vice versa (see Fig. 
13). More specifically, expected damages are higher in FSU, USA, JPN, EEC and lower in 
CHN and ROW and this is then mirrored by adaptive responses. Note also that changes in 
adaptation  expenditure  are  larger  than  those  in  damages.  This  is  the  consequence  of  the 
interaction between mitigation and adaptation: under spatial uncertainty total mitigation effort 
is reduced and this pushes up adaptation.   
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Figure 13 Percentage change of the optimal mitigation rates   
 
To sum up, spatial uncertainty changes the damage distribution among the regions, hence 
changes the distribution of adaptation investments, which is implemented to reduce regional 
damages.  By  contrary,  the  expected  damage  at  the  global  scale  does  not  change  as 
significantly as the regional damage, and the variation of the optimal mitigation rate is not as 
significant as that of adaptation investment. 
This has also important policy implication. We cannot claim as suggested by Lecoq and 
Shalizi (2007) that spatial uncertainty increases the cost-effectiveness of mitigation respect to 
that  of  adaptation,  and  the  need  for  mitigation  should  be  strengthened.  In  fact  spatial 
uncertainty can well increase considerably adaptation investment with respect to the certainty 
case, when there is a good probability to experience higher damages. Nevertheless we show 
clearly that optimal mitigation, designed to respond to global damages, is much less sensitive 
to spatial uncertainty than adaptation. Under this perspective, mitigation offers a ―safer‖ or 
more robust strategy to a policy decision maker than adaptation. In other words in a spatial 
uncertainty context, a given mitigation policy can be expected to perform on average better, 
or to be revised less, than a given adaptation policy. This is an additional factor that should be 
considered,  especially  during  international  negotiation  processes,  in  deciding  mitigation 
efforts that can play in favor of mitigation compared to adaptation. 
5. Conclusion 
Mitigation and adaptation are two wings that support the policy maker in the struggle against 
climate change. While there is a broad consensus about the importance of both of them, there 
is still a significant knowledge gap in defining the effective optimal mix between mitigation 
and adaptation, their trade off and complementarities. Although a growing, albeit still thin 
literature addressed this issue using economic-climate-environmental integrated assessment 
models, none of them included explicitly uncertainty in the picture. The present work fills this 
gap  by  introducing  two  sources  of  uncertainty  into the  analysis:  event  uncertainty  or  the 
uncertain occurrence of a climate catastrophe triggered by temperature increase, and spatial 
uncertainty i.e. an imperfect knowledge on the geographic distribution of the climatic damage. 
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advantageous strategy over adaptation, but because of different causes. 
When event uncertainty is concerned mitigation becomes relatively more important than 
adaptation as, by curbing emissions, it helps to reduce temperature increase and hence the 
probability of the occurrence of the event. Adaptation has no impact on this. Therefore, the 
optimal  mitigation  rate  is  pulled  up  under  the  event  uncertainty,  while  the  adaptation 
investment  is  insensitive  to  it.  In  fact,  the  higher  mitigation  effort  moderately  decreases 
adaptation investment. Indeed mitigation and adaptation remain economic substitutes under 
event uncertainty: more adaptation decreases the need to mitigate and more mitigation that to 
adapt. However this crowding-out effect is much weaker if compared to that in the certainty 
case.   
It is also shown that optimal mitigation responses are much less sensitive than adaptation 
responses to spatial uncertainty. Mitigation responds to global damages, while adaptation to 
local damages. The first, being aggregated, change less than the second in the presence of 
spatial  uncertainty  as  higher  expected  losses  in  some  regions  are  compensated  by  lower 
expected  losses  in  other.  Accordingly,  mitigation  changes  less  than  adaptation.  Thus  if  it 
cannot be really claimed that spatial uncertainty increases the weight of mitigation respect to 
that of adaptation, however its presence makes mitigation a ―safer‖ or more robust strategy to 
a policy decision maker than adaptation. 
This  has  important  policy  implications:  in  a  world  with  climate-related  catastrophic 
event uncertainty mitigation becomes the key policy variable as it is the only strategy able to 
reduce the probability of the catastrophic outcomes. As a consequence mitigation should be 
decided, possibly without delay, following precautionary considerations in the presence of 
discontinuity and irreversibility and not, or not only at least, following standard cost benefit 
analyses performed in a smooth/continuous damage context. Then adaptation can be deployed 
to tackle the residual damage not accommodated by mitigation. Investing on mitigation has 
another advantage: considering the difficulty to assess ex-ante the economic dimension of 
region-specific  damages,  it  endows  the  policy  decision  maker  with  a  tool  which  is  more 
robust to uncertainty than adaptation. Therefore the policy decision maker can be confident 
that by mitigating the probability of a planning mistake is somewhat smaller. All what said 
obviously  applies  in  the  context  of  a  global  policy  which  aims  to  internalize  climate 












Appendix: The Structure of the Model 
Sets 
        n: 1-5, regions, with reference to USA (the United States), EEC (the European Union), JPN 
(Japan), CHN (China), FSU (Former Soviet Nations), ROW (Rest of the World); 
t: 1-12, time scale, 10 years as a unit; from 1990 to 2010; 
 
Parameters 
        ω: utility weight for every regions; 
        R: discount rate; 
        γ: elasticity of output with respect to the capital stocks; 
        b1,b2,b3: parameters of the mitigation cost function; 
        a1,a2: parameters of the damage function; 
        δK: depreciation rate of capital stocks; 
        δIA: depreciation rate of adaptation capital stocks; 
        c1,c2,c3,c4: parameters of climatic equation; 
        λ: feedback parameter in climatic equation 
        σ: CO2 emission/GDP ratio 
        ΔM: the removal rate of CO2 stocks in the atmosphere; 
        θ: the retention rate of CO2 stocks in the atmosphere; 
        η: parameter #1 of the hazard rate function of the catastrophic occurrence 
ϕ0:parameter #2 of the hazard rate function of the catastrophic occurrence 
 
Exogenous Variables 
        A: the Total Factor Productivity; 
        L: the population level; 
        Fo: the exogenous forces of the greenhouse gases other than CO2; 
        Endogenous Variables 
        U: aggregated utility level 
        YG: gross output (trillion dollars); 
        YN: net output (trillion dollars); 
        Ω: damage parameter; 
        C: consumption (trillion dollars); 
        I: capital investment (trillion dollars); 
        K: capital stocks (trillion dollars); 
        IA: adaptation investment (trillion dollars); 
        SAD: adaptation investment stocks (trillion dollars); 
        μ: mitigation rate (0≤μ≤1); 
        E: CO2 emission to the atmosphere (hundred million tons); 
        M: CO2 stocks in the atmosphere (hundred million tons); 
        T: atmospheric temperature (° C); 
        To: oceanic temperature (° C); 
        F: radiative force of the greenhouse gases in the atmosphere; 19 
 
D: residual damage suffered from the climate change. 
 
Equations 
Aggregated Utility Equation 
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Uncertainty Equation 
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Expected Damage Equation 
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